Ekonomichna Pravda reports…

Russia has prohibited transport of Ukrainian goods and Ukraine tried to establish a road around [Russia]. However, the “Silk Road” project did not work. What happened?

After the introduction of transit embargo on Ukrainian goods by Russia in early 2016, Ukraine has joined the international project “Silk Road” -a route circumventing Russia.

Not long after that, the first, experimental train, which included both a railway and ship across the Black and the Caspian sea, was launched along the route out of the port Chernomorsk, through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and into China.

Highest rank officials have taken part in the launch ceremony: the Minister of Infrastructure, Andriy Pyvovarskyi, the Minister of Economic Development, Ayvaras Abramovichus, Deputy Prime Minister, Hennadiy Zubko, and also the head of Odessa Regional State Administration, Mikheil Saakashvili.

The first train attracted attention in Europe and Asia. A special map was published on the website of Ministry of Infrastructure, with the help of which one could track online the movement of the train.

It was mentioned that the train will start working in a business regime within several weeks. However, from the beginning something went not according to plan. Subsequently, all the people involved in the launch have mentioned this project less and less, and then the project completely disappeared from the information field of Ukraine. What happened?

Test train

On 15 January 2016, Ukraine launched an experimental freight train to China, along “the Great Silk road”, circumventing Russia by going through Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

After the launch, then Minister of Infrastructure, Andriy Pyvovarskiy, said the train could start working fully starting March 2016.

The train was composed of ten cars and twenty 40-foot containers. The cars were partially empty, and partially loaded with metal products* to be offloaded in Georgia. The empty cars were to be loaded with products in China.

It was expected that the duration of the route to Dostyk, on the border of China and Kazakhstan, would be 11-12 days. Back then, the Ministry of Infrastructure informed us that the test train was launched to workout the route, and for operators of the train to establish mutual working relationships in the participating countries.

The demonstrative train went through the Black Sea, and through main stations, the port of Batumi, Alyat, Aktau-port, Beyneu, Zhezkazgan, Balkash-1. After 15.5 days the train arrived in its final destination, to the Dostyk station, which is on the border of PRC. After that, the cargoes should have gone to the large industrial cities of China.

After that, problems began. The train has been stuck at the Chinese border, and it could not return for a long time over the absence of clients. Only on 7 April the train was dispatched empty out of the Dostyk station, and it arrived in Chernomorsk on 19 April.

The Ukrainian Railways have said the regularity of the train would depend on market demand. The company said in April: “At this time, the potential traffic flow is being studied, which can be reoriented into a transport train. We are looking at making this a regular service.”

A train that couldn’t

Questions about the way have already appeared during the preparation phase of the project. The experts talked about a significantly longer delivery time in comparison with the habitual route through Russia, and about the regularity of trains, which prevented businesses to schedule loads.

Doubts have also risen around the two maritime stages of the route: the train was exported on ferries across two seas. That is four entries into a port, ride on a specially equipped ferry, and a high probability of adverse weather.

According to an expert in river and maritime transport of the Ukrainian Logistic Association, Oleksandr Lysenko, first they should have studied the demand for this route.

Was this done?

The Ministry of Infrastructure said domestic producers of carton, stone, ceramic tiles, rubber products, metal constructions, furniture, food and agricultural products are interested.

Judging by the fact that the train did not become regular, there did appear any demand.

After two and a half years, EP (Ekonomichna Pravda) asked Ukrainian Railways what is going on with the project since nobody announced its closure.

It seems nobody is engaged in it. We received the same answer from the company which was publicised already in April 2016. [Exactly] word for word:

“At this time, the potential traffic flow is being studied, which can be reoriented into a transport train. We are looking at making this a regular service.”

During this time, the company only determined the single comprehensive cost of transport on the route: Slawkow (Poland) – Altynkol’ (Chinese-Kazakh border) for a 40 feet container. It is $4281, and the journey takes 15 days. We did not receive any information about a commencement of regular work of the project from the company.

For the future

Experts the EP has asked say the project has failed because it could not compete with other variants of transporting cargo from China to Europe.

Oleksandr Kava says:

“Other routes had been more attractive than the so called Transcaspian route, since it has many intermodal moments: [that is] reloading from the railroad to one ferry in the beginning, then another ferry. The number of container trains on the Eurasian route through Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus is increasing. While the Transcaspian corridor has stagnated.”

Ivan Ous, an expert of the Institute of Strategic Studies also acknowledges the economic bankruptcy of the plan:

“The project had political pluses. It was a period when Russia began to restrict our export. Back then it was important. However, it is more expensive, and the business did not immediately agree with it.” 

Former Deputy Minister of Infrastructure, Volodymyr Shul’meyster says:

“The first question is cost, the second is regularity. The Businessmen cannot make orders if they are unsure whether the train will run.”

That is a one important aspect, which has to do with marketing. According to Shul’meyster:

“Problem was in how to correctly “sell” this route. The Ukrainian Railways have a weak marketing policy that’s why they cannot sell normally, even though there is a demand for such a train. Finding a cargo on both sides is a major problem. The more full [the train] will be, the cheaper it will be.”

Does this project have a future? Opinions on this differ. Kava said:

“It doesn’t have any future. Even after the route got cheaper, the dispatchers prefer the Russian option because in that case the cargo moves on the railway the whole time. They increased the speed of traffic and the Transcaspian route with two ferry lines lost in the competition.”

Ous says:

“I would not abandon this idea. It is an expensive option but one that allows not trading through Russia. Moscow has created a significant problem for us, we have a choice, either expensive or nothing. I think we will use this option.”

Ukrinform reports…

Ukraine should not allow division of the society during elections because it will be used by the Russians.

This was said on a press conference, by the president of the National Democratic Institute (NDI, USA). Derek Mitchell, while analysing the pre-election environment in Ukraine.

“Social divisions, we have to be careful about those… The Russian will take advantage of any element of social division. They are opportunists… they will find those divisions and they will exploit them. So one way to prevent it, or to inoculate one self against it, is to allow for the natural political debate, political contest to go on. But ensure that political contest does not bleed into use of techniques or messages that exacerbate social division. We make that point in the statement. Once you do that, once you play on some of the foundational issues of the country, then the Russians can much more easily play indirectly but also through digital platforms like Facebook or others. So that’s why we call for Facebook explicitly to leave the office in Moscow and come to… they can maybe have it in Moscow…  but have also an office in Kiev. With Ukrainian speakers. The folks, who are focused 24/7, in a war room environment, they had this for our election, recent mid-term election. For others, if they test it, kind of 24/7 war room to ensure their platform is not misused for misinformation, for hate, to exacerbate social divisions that create instability, to really undermine a society… in a country. So, I think there are responsibilities by those on the outside not to create problems, there is certainly more need for more digital literacy in internally, so people know what they are seeing and identify when they are being exploited potentially by Russian disinformation. You can for instance, we talked about advertisements on TV, which should be marked, who are the funders of that. So there is… more transparency the better. The more that society is working together during the electoral period and there is confidence in the process. Then the Russians have less ability to exploit those divisions for their own ends. So there are things that can be done, even if they try through other methods to hurt the stability, security and unity of the country.”

That’s enough…

I was recently watching a recent podcast of Egor Prosvirnin of Sputnik & Pogrom fame…

In it, Prosvirnin regrets (much like I do) the recent elections in Donbass, which could have been used to legitimise local governments, were instead planned in a classically Putinist way to have a predictable outcome, which would result in the victory of a candidate easily manipulable by Moscow’s curators.

Nevertheless, Prosvirnin brings attention to the words of Alexey Chesnakov, the director of Centre for Political Conjuncture, who according to Prosvirnin is a mouthpiece used for communication with the public of Vladislav Surkov, the person Kremlin made responsible for Donbass. According to Chesnakov:

“…the electoral campaign, and unprecedented voter turnout have shown high support of the citizens to a course chosen by the government of the republics in 2014. It is a definitive victory of pro-Russian electorate, and pro-Russian forces.”

This is an unprecedented acknowledgement of the interests of the Donbass peoples from somebody purportedly a spokesman for the Kremlin. Of course, the system does not imply annexation by Russia but it is a confirmation of the situation in which the two republics are dependent territories of Russia. Does it mean abandonment of the failed effort to impose federalisation upon Ukraine? I can’t say!

Meanwhile recently, on the other side in Kiev, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin, or whoever writes posts on his Twitter, has once again demonstrated the unwillingness and inability of Kiev to integrate Donbass.

The idea that Donbass, with its current consciousness is somehow unfitting for Ukraine is not new. Klimkin’s above Tweet is just a sanitised repeat of the street version. Klimkin however acknowledges Donbass’ dependence upon Russia in the wake of Donbass elections, much in tune with what Chesnakov said.

And finally, check out a new video that I posted on my youtube channel, it allegedly comes from Lugansk on election day. It suggests a lot…

I would like to talk about the stark similarities between the rehabilitation of Stalin and the USSR in Russia and the rehabilitation of Bandera and UPA in Ukraine…

As the two countries came out of the shadow of Communism and gained sovereignty, the cults of Bandera, Shukhevych, the UPA on one hand, and Stalin and the USSR on the other were rather marginal. As Levada polling shows the popularity of Stalin in the early nineties was rather marginal. It is something that grew steadily over the nineteen nineties. Before the second Maidan, Russian Stalinophilia even spilled over to the Russian speaking regions of Ukraine. In 2010, the Communists in Zaporozhie set up a bust of Stalin, which stood there for 7 months. It was first decapitated and then blown up on Bandera’s birthday on 1st January 2011.

In 1997, the British researcher Andrew Wilson claimed the appeal of “narrow ethnonationalism” is limited by “historical, ethnic, linguistic factors”. Wilson noted however that Ukrainian nationalism had “a strong emotive appeal to a minority, who may thus undermine Ukraine’s attempts to construct an open civic state.”

Fast forward 20 years and the nationalist agenda seems to have gained the upper hand over the civic and multiethnic alternative. Not only has the nationalist agenda for the linguistic sphere, that is affirmative action for the Ukrainian language, been implemented, the state accepts the nationalist point of view on historical events. The secession of Crimea and Donbass has removed much of the Russian element which previously formed a formidable opposition to Ukrainisation attempts. What remains of the Russian element in the South and East of the country is now seriously weakened as an opposition force.

This arguably is the biggest difference the cult of Bandera in Ukraine has with the Russian cult of Stalin. In Russia, while many influential people are engaged in popularising Stalin, the state itself has not endorsed Stalin. And there are even instances, when the state opposes monuments to Stalin. Recently in Novosibirsk, local Art’s Council rejected a bust of Stalin that was to be installed in the city on the initiative of the Communist Party. Putin himself said in interview to Oliver Stone that Stalin was a controversial figure which ought to be seen in it historical context. The Gulag Archipelago by Solzhenitsyn is included in literature programme in Russian schools.

This is a qualitatively different attitude from Ukraine. Due to differing historical circumstances (two Maidans, secession, and civil war), the rehabilitation of Bandera has been much more endorsed by the state. There is an “Avennue of Stepan Bandera” in Kiev now but Moscow still waits for its Stalin Street. It appears most Stalin streets in Russia are in the republics of North Caucasus. Certainly, Moscow and the majority of big cities is still untouched. Perhaps in the future, the Russian Stalinophiles will get enough influence to immortalise their moustached idol in the capital.

While there definitely is a qualitative difference between the two phenomena, there is a similarity when it comes to motivation. The growth of both of thesecults appears to be a reaction to the failed transformation from planned economy to capitalism, and from the rule of one party to pluralism. High levels of poverty, political instability, rule by robber barons in both countries has caused some people to look up to these rather ghoulish figures. You often hear the Ukrainian nationalists shout at their marches: “Bandera, priyde, poryadok navede!”, which means “Bandera will come, he will establish order!” They want a new order, not the current one established in the nineties. Surprisingly, or rather not, the Stalinophiles think in exactly the same way.

Enjoy videos of the troglodytes below:

…

You can’t make this up…

Strana.ua reports

US Embassy has voiced its opposition to preferences to Ukrainian coal

The Americans are unhappy about the government measures directed towards the support of the coal industry, which the Ukrainian government plans to enact.

Strana learned that the US Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch wrote a letter to the Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman, in which she asked [the government] to “reject the idea of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry regarding the priority of purchasing electrical energy that was created using domestic coal (of the gaseous group) over that which was created using imported (anthracite coal).”

The ambassador puts forward the argument that last year the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine already blocked a similar project as a discriminatory and deterring competition on the market.

It says in the letter:

“We think that this suggested decision would in fact restrict the country’s access to diversified sources of energy, and that’s why it will weaken [her] energy security.” 

It is apparent that [the letter] talks about imports of coal from the US, which has already acquired a name in Ukraine: “Pennsylvania plus.”

In the letter it is, in fact, clearly suggested that “Pennsylvania plus” can, just in case, be cut off.

“Last year we celebrated Ukrainian purchase of coal from the US as a step towards energy security of your country. And the measures, that are currently being looked at, are seen as restricting Ukraine’s access to global markets.”

By the way, in 7 months of the current year, the share of anthracite from the US was 31% out of all coal imports. According to the scheme, “Pennsylvania plus”, [the Americans] have delivered 0.5 billion worth of coal.

It is also said in the letter that [giving] priority to the use of Ukrainian coal could cause the electrical energy to be more expensive, and would force the companies using electrical energy to limit their production of energy. This would lower the attractiveness of the Ukrainian energy market and could abort the privatisation of “Centrenergo”.

The authenticity of the letter was confirmed to us by the president of the Independent Union of Miners, Mikhail Volynets, who also posses an identical copy of the letter.

Interestingly, on 26 October there was a government meeting the topic of which was coal industry. According to Volynets, the protocol decision of this meeting  has emerged, the copy of which is also in possession of Strana.

The document contains the recommendation of the Prime Minister Volodymyr Hroysman to the Minister of Energy Nasalyk to take immediate measures to correct the situation until the end of this year.

Among the measures, the Ministry of Energy would within a week (which in fact ended last week) prepare a project of an act about the definition of priority of Ukrainian coal for the production of electrical energy.

The president of the Union of workers of the coal industry, Victor Turmanov who was presented at the meeting on 26 October confirmed to Strana they were promised money for modernisation of the shafts.

“We have asked for 4.8 billion hryvnia for the next year. In the projected budget there is only 650 million for liquidation of the shafts (the reform plans to close unpromising shafts) and 1.6 billion for everything else” 

According to his words if the money is received, in seven months we can expect increase in production from 11 thousand tons per day to 30 thousand tons.

“It will not happen sooner because we need to buy machines and go through modernisation.”

According to Turmanov the purchase of domestic coal is more lucrative because the imported coal is more expensive (currently the price is 110 dollars for a ton, and the price will only grow). But in order to switch to gaseous coal of the “G”mark, which is being mined in Ukraine, from the imported anthracite, the boilers would have to be refitted.

The situation at shafts is very tense. People did not receive their salary for several months.

***

Source

Earlier this blog reported Ukraine plans to buy 72% of her imported coal from Russia in 2019.

I am quoting Olga Pishchulina of the Razumkov Centre:

“At the beginning of cardinal economic transformation in Ukraine considerable scientific-technical and educational capital was saved up. But the crisis phenomena that has permanently accompanied Ukraine since 1991 and the inconsistency of those economic transformations that take place in the country have led to not really positive consequences. We are witnessing depreciation of human capital. Its value falls. Not only weak social groups, but also strong representatives of the middle class and representatives of small and medium business suffered in the course of economic transformations,”

…

“Ukraine is losing its intellectual capital, there is a deterioration in the state of health and the quality of education,”

Reprinted from Stalker Zone